mirror of
https://github.com/archlinuxarm/PKGBUILDs.git
synced 2025-01-17 23:34:07 +00:00
removed core/coreutils, builds properly on ARM now
This commit is contained in:
Kevin Mihelich
parent
f1f1d22e65
commit
13c9393f71
5 changed files with 0 additions and 701 deletions
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@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
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# $Id$
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# Maintainer: Allan McRae <allan@archlinux.org>
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# Contributor: judd <jvinet@zeroflux.org>
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# PlugApps: Kevin Mihelich <kevin@plugapps.com>
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# - 8.10 is broken for us atm, using this until we get it working
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plugrel=1
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pkgname=coreutils
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pkgver=8.9
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pkgrel=1
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pkgdesc="The basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities of the GNU operating system"
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arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
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license=('GPL3')
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url="http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils"
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groups=('base')
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depends=('glibc' 'shadow' 'pam' 'acl' 'gmp' 'libcap')
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replaces=('mktemp')
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backup=('etc/pam.d/su')
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install=${pkgname}.install
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options=('!emptydirs')
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source=(ftp://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
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coreutils-uname.patch
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coreutils-pam.patch
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su.pam)
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md5sums=('4a38f51941bae177c997cda9bdc603bd'
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'c4fcca138b6abf6d443d48a6f0cd8833'
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'aad79a2aa6d566c375d7bdd1b0767278'
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'fa85e5cce5d723275b14365ba71a8aad')
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build() {
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cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
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# added su wheel group pam patch (from fedora git)
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patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-pam.patch
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# linux specific uname improvement (from gentoo portage)
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patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/coreutils-uname.patch
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autoreconf -v
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./configure --prefix=/usr \
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--enable-install-program=su \
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--enable-no-install-program=groups,hostname,kill,uptime \
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--enable-pam
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make
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make RUN_EXPENSIVE_TESTS=yes check
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}
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package() {
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cd ${srcdir}/${pkgname}-${pkgver}
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make DESTDIR=${pkgdir} install
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cd ${pkgdir}/usr/bin
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install -dm755 ${pkgdir}/{bin,usr/sbin}
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# binaries required by FHS
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_fhs="cat chgrp chmod chown cp date dd df echo false ln ls \
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mkdir mknod mv pwd rm rmdir stty su sync true uname"
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mv ${_fhs} ${pkgdir}/bin
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# binaries required by various Arch scripts
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_bin="cut dir dircolors du install mkfifo readlink shred \
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sleep touch tr vdir"
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mv ${_bin} ${pkgdir}/bin
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ln -sf /bin/sleep ${pkgdir}/usr/bin/sleep
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mv chroot ${pkgdir}/usr/sbin
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install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/su.pam ${pkgdir}/etc/pam.d/su
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}
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@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
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diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac coreutils-8.4/configure.ac
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--- coreutils-8.4-orig/configure.ac 2010-01-11 18:20:42.000000000 +0100
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+++ coreutils-8.4/configure.ac 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
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@@ -126,6 +126,13 @@ if test "$gl_gcc_warnings" = yes; then
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AC_SUBST([GNULIB_WARN_CFLAGS])
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fi
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+dnl Give the chance to enable PAM
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+AC_ARG_ENABLE(pam, dnl
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+[ --enable-pam Enable use of the PAM libraries],
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+[AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define if you want to use PAM])
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+LIB_PAM="-ldl -lpam -lpam_misc"
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+AC_SUBST(LIB_PAM)])
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+
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AC_FUNC_FORK
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optional_bin_progs=
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diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi
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--- coreutils-8.4-orig/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
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+++ coreutils-8.4/doc/coreutils.texi 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
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@@ -15081,8 +15081,11 @@ to certain shells, etc.).
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@findex syslog
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@command{su} can optionally be compiled to use @code{syslog} to report
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failed, and optionally successful, @command{su} attempts. (If the system
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-supports @code{syslog}.) However, GNU @command{su} does not check if the
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-user is a member of the @code{wheel} group; see below.
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+supports @code{syslog}.)
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+
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+This version of @command{su} has support for using PAM for
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+authentication. You can edit @file{/etc/pam.d/su} to customize its
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+behaviour.
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The program accepts the following options. Also see @ref{Common options}.
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@@ -15124,6 +15127,8 @@ environment variables except @env{TERM},
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@env{PATH} to a compiled-in default value. Change to @var{user}'s home
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directory. Prepend @samp{-} to the shell's name, intended to make it
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read its login startup file(s).
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+Additionaly @env{DISPLAY} and @env{XAUTHORITY} environment variables
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+are preserved as well for PAM functionality.
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@item -m
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@itemx -p
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@@ -15163,33 +15168,6 @@ Exit status:
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the exit status of the subshell otherwise
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@end display
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-@cindex wheel group, not supported
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-@cindex group wheel, not supported
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-@cindex fascism
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-@subsection Why GNU @command{su} does not support the @samp{wheel} group
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-
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-(This section is by Richard Stallman.)
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-
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-@cindex Twenex
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-@cindex MIT AI lab
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-Sometimes a few of the users try to hold total power over all the
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-rest. For example, in 1984, a few users at the MIT AI lab decided to
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-seize power by changing the operator password on the Twenex system and
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-keeping it secret from everyone else. (I was able to thwart this coup
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-and give power back to the users by patching the kernel, but I
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-wouldn't know how to do that in Unix.)
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-
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-However, occasionally the rulers do tell someone. Under the usual
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-@command{su} mechanism, once someone learns the root password who
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-sympathizes with the ordinary users, he or she can tell the rest. The
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-``wheel group'' feature would make this impossible, and thus cement the
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-power of the rulers.
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-
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-I'm on the side of the masses, not that of the rulers. If you are
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-used to supporting the bosses and sysadmins in whatever they do, you
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-might find this idea strange at first.
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-
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-
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@node timeout invocation
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@section @command{timeout}: Run a command with a time limit
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diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am
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--- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/Makefile.am 2010-01-03 18:06:20.000000000 +0100
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+++ coreutils-8.4/src/Makefile.am 2010-02-12 10:17:46.000000000 +0100
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@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ factor_LDADD += $(LIB_GMP)
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uptime_LDADD += $(GETLOADAVG_LIBS)
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# for crypt
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-su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT)
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+su_LDADD += $(LIB_CRYPT) @LIB_PAM@
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# for various ACL functions
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copy_LDADD += $(LIB_ACL)
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diff -urNp coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c coreutils-8.4/src/su.c
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--- coreutils-8.4-orig/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:15:15.000000000 +0100
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+++ coreutils-8.4/src/su.c 2010-02-12 10:24:29.000000000 +0100
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@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@
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restricts who can su to UID 0 accounts. RMS considers that to
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be fascist.
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+#ifdef USE_PAM
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+
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+ Actually, with PAM, su has nothing to do with whether or not a
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+ wheel group is enforced by su. RMS tries to restrict your access
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+ to a su which implements the wheel group, but PAM considers that
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+ to be fascist, and gives the user/sysadmin the opportunity to
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+ enforce a wheel group by proper editing of /etc/pam.conf
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+
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+#endif
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+
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Compile-time options:
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-DSYSLOG_SUCCESS Log successful su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
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-DSYSLOG_FAILURE Log failed su's (by default, to root) with syslog.
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@@ -53,6 +63,15 @@
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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+#ifdef USE_PAM
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+# include <signal.h>
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+# include <sys/wait.h>
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+# include <sys/fsuid.h>
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+# include <unistd.h>
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+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
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+# include <security/pam_misc.h>
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+#endif /* USE_PAM */
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+
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#include "system.h"
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#include "getpass.h"
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@@ -120,10 +139,17 @@
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/* The user to become if none is specified. */
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#define DEFAULT_USER "root"
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+#ifndef USE_PAM
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char *crypt (char const *key, char const *salt);
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+#endif
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-static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t)
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+static void run_shell (char const *, char const *, char **, size_t,
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+ const struct passwd *)
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+#ifdef USE_PAM
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+ ;
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+#else
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ATTRIBUTE_NORETURN;
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+#endif
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/* If true, pass the `-f' option to the subshell. */
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static bool fast_startup;
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@@ -209,7 +235,26 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
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}
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#endif
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+#ifdef USE_PAM
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+static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
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+static int retval;
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+static struct pam_conv conv = {
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+ misc_conv,
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+ NULL
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+};
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+
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+#define PAM_BAIL_P if (retval) { \
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+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
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+ return 0; \
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+}
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+#define PAM_BAIL_P_VOID if (retval) { \
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+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); \
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+return; \
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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/* Ask the user for a password.
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+ If PAM is in use, let PAM ask for the password if necessary.
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Return true if the user gives the correct password for entry PW,
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false if not. Return true without asking for a password if run by UID 0
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or if PW has an empty password. */
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@@ -217,6 +262,44 @@ log_su (struct passwd const *pw, bool su
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static bool
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correct_password (const struct passwd *pw)
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{
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+#ifdef USE_PAM
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+ struct passwd *caller;
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+ char *tty_name, *ttyn;
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+ retval = pam_start(PROGRAM_NAME, pw->pw_name, &conv, &pamh);
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
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+
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+ if (getuid() != 0 && !isatty(0)) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, "standard in must be a tty\n");
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+ exit(1);
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+ }
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+
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+ caller = getpwuid(getuid());
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+ if(caller != NULL && caller->pw_name != NULL) {
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+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, caller->pw_name);
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
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+ }
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+
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+ ttyn = ttyname(0);
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+ if (ttyn) {
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+ if (strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
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+ tty_name = ttyn+5;
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+ else
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+ tty_name = ttyn;
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+ retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, tty_name);
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
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+ }
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+ retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
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+ retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
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+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
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+ /* password has expired. Offer option to change it. */
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+ retval = pam_chauthtok(pamh, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
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+ }
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+ PAM_BAIL_P;
|
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+ /* must be authenticated if this point was reached */
|
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+ return 1;
|
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+#else /* !USE_PAM */
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char *unencrypted, *encrypted, *correct;
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#if HAVE_GETSPNAM && HAVE_STRUCT_SPWD_SP_PWDP
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/* Shadow passwd stuff for SVR3 and maybe other systems. */
|
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@@ -241,6 +324,7 @@ correct_password (const struct passwd *p
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encrypted = crypt (unencrypted, correct);
|
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memset (unencrypted, 0, strlen (unencrypted));
|
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return STREQ (encrypted, correct);
|
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+#endif /* !USE_PAM */
|
||||
}
|
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|
||||
/* Update `environ' for the new shell based on PW, with SHELL being
|
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@@ -254,12 +338,18 @@ modify_environment (const struct passwd
|
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/* Leave TERM unchanged. Set HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME, PATH.
|
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Unset all other environment variables. */
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char const *term = getenv ("TERM");
|
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+ char const *display = getenv ("DISPLAY");
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+ char const *xauthority = getenv ("XAUTHORITY");
|
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if (term)
|
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term = xstrdup (term);
|
||||
environ = xmalloc ((6 + !!term) * sizeof (char *));
|
||||
environ[0] = NULL;
|
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if (term)
|
||||
xsetenv ("TERM", term);
|
||||
+ if (display)
|
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+ xsetenv ("DISPLAY", display);
|
||||
+ if (xauthority)
|
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+ xsetenv ("XAUTHORITY", xauthority);
|
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xsetenv ("HOME", pw->pw_dir);
|
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xsetenv ("SHELL", shell);
|
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xsetenv ("USER", pw->pw_name);
|
||||
@@ -292,8 +382,13 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_INITGROUPS
|
||||
errno = 0;
|
||||
- if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
|
||||
+ if (initgroups (pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
|
||||
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
||||
+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
|
||||
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set groups"));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
endgrent ();
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (setgid (pw->pw_gid))
|
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@@ -302,6 +397,31 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
|
||||
error (EXIT_CANCELED, errno, _("cannot set user id"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
||||
+static int caught=0;
|
||||
+/* Signal handler for parent process later */
|
||||
+static void su_catch_sig(int sig)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ ++caught;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+int
|
||||
+pam_copyenv (pam_handle_t *pamh)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ char **env;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ env = pam_getenvlist(pamh);
|
||||
+ if(env) {
|
||||
+ while(*env) {
|
||||
+ if (putenv (*env))
|
||||
+ xalloc_die ();
|
||||
+ env++;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return(0);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Run SHELL, or DEFAULT_SHELL if SHELL is empty.
|
||||
If COMMAND is nonzero, pass it to the shell with the -c option.
|
||||
Pass ADDITIONAL_ARGS to the shell as more arguments; there
|
||||
@@ -309,17 +429,49 @@ change_identity (const struct passwd *pw
|
||||
|
||||
static void
|
||||
run_shell (char const *shell, char const *command, char **additional_args,
|
||||
- size_t n_additional_args)
|
||||
+ size_t n_additional_args, const struct passwd *pw)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t n_args = 1 + fast_startup + 2 * !!command + n_additional_args + 1;
|
||||
char const **args = xnmalloc (n_args, sizeof *args);
|
||||
size_t argno = 1;
|
||||
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
||||
+ int child;
|
||||
+ sigset_t ourset;
|
||||
+ int status;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ retval = pam_open_session(pamh,0);
|
||||
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "could not open session\n");
|
||||
+ exit (1);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+/* do this at the last possible moment, because environment variables may
|
||||
+ be passed even in the session phase
|
||||
+*/
|
||||
+ if(pam_copyenv(pamh) != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
||||
+ fprintf (stderr, "error copying PAM environment\n");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Credentials should be set in the parent */
|
||||
+ if (pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, "could not set PAM credentials\n");
|
||||
+ exit(1);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ child = fork();
|
||||
+ if (child == 0) { /* child shell */
|
||||
+ change_identity (pw);
|
||||
+ pam_end(pamh, 0);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (simulate_login)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *arg0;
|
||||
char *shell_basename;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if(chdir(pw->pw_dir))
|
||||
+ error(0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
|
||||
+
|
||||
shell_basename = last_component (shell);
|
||||
arg0 = xmalloc (strlen (shell_basename) + 2);
|
||||
arg0[0] = '-';
|
||||
@@ -344,6 +496,67 @@ run_shell (char const *shell, char const
|
||||
error (0, errno, "%s", shell);
|
||||
exit (exit_status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#ifdef USE_PAM
|
||||
+ } else if (child == -1) {
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, "can not fork user shell: %s", strerror(errno));
|
||||
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
|
||||
+ pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
|
||||
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
|
||||
+ exit(1);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* parent only */
|
||||
+ sigfillset(&ourset);
|
||||
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
|
||||
+ caught = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!caught) {
|
||||
+ struct sigaction action;
|
||||
+ action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
|
||||
+ sigemptyset(&action.sa_mask);
|
||||
+ action.sa_flags = 0;
|
||||
+ sigemptyset(&ourset);
|
||||
+ if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
|
||||
+ || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
|
||||
+ || sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL)
|
||||
+ || sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL)) {
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signal masking malfunction\n", PROGRAM_NAME);
|
||||
+ caught = 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!caught) {
|
||||
+ do {
|
||||
+ int pid;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (((pid_t)-1 != pid) && (0 != WIFSTOPPED (status))) {
|
||||
+ kill(getpid(), WSTOPSIG(status));
|
||||
+ /* once we get here, we must have resumed */
|
||||
+ kill(pid, SIGCONT);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ } while (0 != WIFSTOPPED(status));
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (caught) {
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, "\nSession terminated, killing shell...");
|
||||
+ kill (child, SIGTERM);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ /* Not checking retval on this because we need to call close session */
|
||||
+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED | PAM_SILENT);
|
||||
+ retval = pam_close_session(pamh, 0);
|
||||
+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
|
||||
+ retval = pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
|
||||
+ PAM_BAIL_P_VOID;
|
||||
+ if (caught) {
|
||||
+ sleep(2);
|
||||
+ kill(child, SIGKILL);
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr, " ...killed.\n");
|
||||
+ exit(-1);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ exit ((0 != WIFEXITED (status)) ? WEXITSTATUS (status)
|
||||
+ : WTERMSIG (status) + 128);
|
||||
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Return true if SHELL is a restricted shell (one not returned by
|
||||
@@ -511,9 +724,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
shell = xstrdup (shell ? shell : pw->pw_shell);
|
||||
modify_environment (pw, shell);
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifndef USE_PAM
|
||||
change_identity (pw);
|
||||
- if (simulate_login && chdir (pw->pw_dir) != 0)
|
||||
- error (0, errno, _("warning: cannot change directory to %s"), pw->pw_dir);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* error() flushes stderr, but does not check for write failure.
|
||||
Normally, we would catch this via our atexit() hook of
|
||||
@@ -523,5 +736,5 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
if (ferror (stderr))
|
||||
exit (EXIT_CANCELED);
|
||||
|
||||
- run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind));
|
||||
+ run_shell (shell, command, argv + optind, MAX (0, argc - optind), pw);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
|
|||
On linux platforms, grok /proc/cpuinfo for the CPU/vendor info.
|
||||
|
||||
Prob not suitable for upstream seeing as how it's 100% linux-specific
|
||||
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-coreutils/2005-09/msg00063.html
|
||||
|
||||
Patch originally by Carlos E. Gorges <carlos@techlinux.com.br>, but
|
||||
heavily reworked to suck less.
|
||||
|
||||
To add support for additional platforms, check out the show_cpuinfo()
|
||||
func in the linux/arch/<ARCH>/ source tree of the kernel.
|
||||
|
||||
--- coreutils/src/uname.c
|
||||
+++ coreutils/src/uname.c
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
|
||||
# include <mach-o/arch.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
+#if defined(__linux__)
|
||||
+# define USE_PROCINFO
|
||||
+# define UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
#include "system.h"
|
||||
#include "error.h"
|
||||
#include "quote.h"
|
||||
@@ -138,6 +143,117 @@
|
||||
exit (status);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
|
||||
+# define CPUINFO_FILE "/proc/sysinfo"
|
||||
+# define CPUINFO_FORMAT "%64[^\t :]%*[ :]%256[^\n]%c"
|
||||
+# else
|
||||
+# define CPUINFO_FILE "/proc/cpuinfo"
|
||||
+# define CPUINFO_FORMAT "%64[^\t:]\t:%256[^\n]%c"
|
||||
+# endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+# define PROCINFO_PROCESSOR 0
|
||||
+# define PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM 1
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void __eat_cpuinfo_space(char *buf)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ /* first eat trailing space */
|
||||
+ char *tmp = buf + strlen(buf) - 1;
|
||||
+ while (tmp > buf && isspace(*tmp))
|
||||
+ *tmp-- = '\0';
|
||||
+ /* then eat leading space */
|
||||
+ tmp = buf;
|
||||
+ while (*tmp && isspace(*tmp))
|
||||
+ tmp++;
|
||||
+ if (tmp != buf)
|
||||
+ memmove(buf, tmp, strlen(tmp)+1);
|
||||
+ /* finally collapse whitespace */
|
||||
+ tmp = buf;
|
||||
+ while (tmp[0] && tmp[1]) {
|
||||
+ if (isspace(tmp[0]) && isspace(tmp[1])) {
|
||||
+ memmove(tmp, tmp+1, strlen(tmp));
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ ++tmp;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static int __linux_procinfo(int x, char *fstr, size_t s)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ FILE *fp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ char *procinfo_keys[] = {
|
||||
+ /* --processor --hardware-platform */
|
||||
+ #if defined(__alpha__)
|
||||
+ "cpu model", "system type"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__arm__)
|
||||
+ "Processor", "Hardware"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__avr32__)
|
||||
+ "processor", "cpu family"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__bfin__)
|
||||
+ "CPU", "BOARD Name"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__cris__)
|
||||
+ "cpu", "cpu model"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__frv__)
|
||||
+ "CPU-Core", "System"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
|
||||
+ "model name", "vendor_id"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__ia64__)
|
||||
+ "family", "vendor"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__hppa__)
|
||||
+ "cpu", "model"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__m68k__)
|
||||
+ "CPU", "MMU"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__mips__)
|
||||
+ "cpu model", "system type"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__powerpc64__)
|
||||
+ "cpu", "machine"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
|
||||
+ "Type", "Manufacturer"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__sh__)
|
||||
+ "cpu type", "machine"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(sparc) || defined(__sparc__)
|
||||
+ "type", "cpu"
|
||||
+ #elif defined(__vax__)
|
||||
+ "cpu type", "cpu"
|
||||
+ #else
|
||||
+ "unknown", "unknown"
|
||||
+ #endif
|
||||
+ };
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if ((fp = fopen(CPUINFO_FILE, "r")) != NULL) {
|
||||
+ char key[65], value[257], eol, *ret = NULL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ while (fscanf(fp, CPUINFO_FORMAT, key, value, &eol) != EOF) {
|
||||
+ __eat_cpuinfo_space(key);
|
||||
+ if (!strcmp(key, procinfo_keys[x])) {
|
||||
+ __eat_cpuinfo_space(value);
|
||||
+ ret = value;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (eol != '\n') {
|
||||
+ /* we need two fscanf's here in case the previous
|
||||
+ * length limit caused us to read right up to the
|
||||
+ * newline ... doing "%*[^\n]\n" wont eat the newline
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+ fscanf(fp, "%*[^\n]");
|
||||
+ fscanf(fp, "\n");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ fclose(fp);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ret) {
|
||||
+ strncpy(fstr, ret, s);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Print ELEMENT, preceded by a space if something has already been
|
||||
printed. */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -250,10 +344,14 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
if (toprint & PRINT_PROCESSOR)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char const *element = unknown;
|
||||
-#if HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE
|
||||
+#if ( HAVE_SYSINFO && defined SI_ARCHITECTURE ) || defined(USE_PROCINFO)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static char processor[257];
|
||||
+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
|
||||
+ if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_PROCESSOR, processor, sizeof processor))
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
if (0 <= sysinfo (SI_ARCHITECTURE, processor, sizeof processor))
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
element = processor;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -306,9 +404,13 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
if (element == unknown)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static char hardware_platform[257];
|
||||
+#if defined(USE_PROCINFO)
|
||||
+ if (0 <= __linux_procinfo (PROCINFO_HARDWARE_PLATFORM, hardware_platform, sizeof hardware_platform))
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
size_t s = sizeof hardware_platform;
|
||||
static int mib[] = { CTL_HW, UNAME_HARDWARE_PLATFORM };
|
||||
if (sysctl (mib, 2, hardware_platform, &s, 0, 0) >= 0)
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
element = hardware_platform;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
|
|||
infodir=usr/share/info
|
||||
filelist=(coreutils.info)
|
||||
|
||||
post_install() {
|
||||
[ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
|
||||
for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
|
||||
usr/bin/install-info $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
post_upgrade() {
|
||||
post_install $1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pre_remove() {
|
||||
[ -x usr/bin/install-info ] || return 0
|
||||
for file in ${filelist[@]}; do
|
||||
usr/bin/install-info --delete $infodir/$file.gz $infodir/dir 2> /dev/null
|
||||
done
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
|||
#%PAM-1.0
|
||||
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
|
||||
# Uncomment the following line to implicitly trust users in the "wheel" group.
|
||||
#auth sufficient pam_wheel.so trust use_uid
|
||||
# Uncomment the following line to require a user to be in the "wheel" group.
|
||||
#auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
|
||||
auth required pam_unix.so
|
||||
account required pam_unix.so
|
||||
session required pam_unix.so
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue