diff --git a/community/gradm/PKGBUILD b/community/gradm/PKGBUILD deleted file mode 100644 index d25aaae39..000000000 --- a/community/gradm/PKGBUILD +++ /dev/null @@ -1,49 +0,0 @@ -# Maintainer: Daniel Micay -# Contributor: Jonathan Liu -# Contributor: henning mueller -# Contributor: s1gma -# Contributor: Ahmad24 -# Contributor: maxrp - -# ALARM: Kevin Mihelich -# - comment LIBS mistreatment of ARM in makefile - -pkgname=gradm -_version=3.1 -_timestamp=201701031918 -pkgver=$_version.$_timestamp -pkgrel=1 -pkgdesc="Administration utility for grsecurity's Role Based Access Control (RBAC)" -arch=(i686 x86_64) -url=https://grsecurity.net/ -license=(GPL2) -depends=(pam) -source=(https://grsecurity.net/stable/$pkgname-$_version-$_timestamp.tar.gz - https://grsecurity.net/stable/$pkgname-$_version-$_timestamp.tar.gz.sig - learn_config - policy) -sha256sums=('794eca5fa9f51520ab4a83b8884cb90e7715061f3102bc896d78674b2c2ad94d' - 'SKIP' - '61c3042879ec2303b713f57f751fb66a95e2cc4737fbbd6d95879829c7b7d3c0' - '73cf31add3da55b539777d736764a40c6b30041cc259e1d0372c867b87070440') -validpgpkeys=( - 'DE9452CE46F42094907F108B44D1C0F82525FE49' # Bradley Spengler -) - -prepare() { - cd $pkgname - sed -i -e 's/^CFLAGS :=/CFLAGS +=/' -e 's:sbin:usr/bin:' Makefile - sed -i 's/^LIBS/#LIBS/' Makefile -} - -build() { - cd $pkgname - make -} - -package() { - cd $pkgname - make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install - cp "$srcdir"/{learn_config,policy} "$pkgdir/etc/grsec" - rm -r "$pkgdir/dev" -} diff --git a/community/gradm/learn_config b/community/gradm/learn_config deleted file mode 100644 index f4d951fb7..000000000 --- a/community/gradm/learn_config +++ /dev/null @@ -1,168 +0,0 @@ -#This configuration file aids the learning process by tweaking -#the learning algorithm for specific paths. -# -#It accepts lines in the form of -#Where can be inherit-learn, no-learn, inherit-no-learn, -#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, protected-path, high-protected-path, -#read-protected-path, and always-reduce-path -# -#inherit-learn, no-learn, and inherit-no-learn operate only with -#full learning -# -#high-reduce-path, dont-reduce-path, always-reduce-path, protected-path, -#and high-protected-path operate on both full and and regular learning -#(subject and role learning) -# -#inherit-learn changes the learning process for the specified path -#by throwing all learned accesses for every binary executed by the -#processes contained in the pathname into the subject specified -#by the pathname. This is useful for cron in the case of full -#system learning, so that scripts that eventually end up executing -#mv or rm with privilege don't cause the root policy to grant -#that privilege to mv or rm in all cases. -# -#no-learn allows processes within the path to perform any operation -#that normal system usage would allow without restriction. If -#a process is generating a huge number of learning logs, it may be -#best to use this command on that process and configure its policy -#manually. -# -#inherit-no-learn combines the above two cases, such that processes -#within the specified path will be able to perform any normal system -#operation without restriction as will any binaries executed by -#these processes. -# -#high-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process -#to weight in favor of reducing accesses for this path -# -#dont-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process -#so that it will never reduce accesses for this path -# -#always-reduce-path modifies the heuristics of the learning process -#so that the path specified will always have all files and directories -#within it reduced to the path specified. -# -#protected-path specifies a path on your system that is considered an -#important resource. Any process that modifies one of these paths -#is given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating -#a secure policy. -# -#read-protected-path specifies a path on your system that contains -#sensitive information. Any process that reads one of these paths is -#given its own subject in the learning process, facilitating a secure -#policy. -# -#high-protected-path specifies a path that should be hidden from -#all processes but those that access it directly. It is recommended -#to use highly sensitive files for this command. -# -#regular expressions are not supported for pathnames in this config file -# -# -# uncomment this next line if you don't wish to generate a policy that -# restricts roles to specific IP ranges: -# dont-learn-allowed-ips -# -# to write out your generated policy such that roles are split into separate -# files by the name of the role (within user/group directories), uncomment -# the next line: -# split-roles - -always-reduce-path /dev/pts -always-reduce-path /var/spool/qmailscan/tmp -always-reduce-path /var/spool/exim4 -always-reduce-path /run/screen -always-reduce-path /usr/share/locale -always-reduce-path /usr/share/zoneinfo -always-reduce-path /usr/share/terminfo -always-reduce-path /var/abs -always-reduce-path /tmp -always-reduce-path /var/tmp - -high-reduce-path /run/udev -high-reduce-path /dev/mapper -high-reduce-path /dev/snd -high-reduce-path /proc -high-reduce-path /usr/lib/security -high-reduce-path /usr/lib/modules -high-reduce-path /usr/lib -high-reduce-path /usr/lib32 -high-reduce-path /usr/libx32 -high-reduce-path /usr/lib/tls -high-reduce-path /usr/lib32/tls -high-reduce-path /usr/libx32/tls -high-reduce-path /usr/lib/libreoffice -high-reduce-path /var/lib -high-reduce-path /usr/bin -high-reduce-path /usr/sbin -high-reduce-path /usr/local/share -high-reduce-path /usr/local/bin -high-reduce-path /usr/local/sbin -high-reduce-path /usr/local/etc -high-reduce-path /usr/local/lib -high-reduce-path /usr/share -high-reduce-path /usr/X11R6/lib -high-reduce-path /var/lib/openldap-data -high-reduce-path /var/lib/krb5kdc - -dont-reduce-path / -dont-reduce-path /home -dont-reduce-path /dev -dont-reduce-path /usr -dont-reduce-path /var -dont-reduce-path /opt - -protected-path /etc -protected-path /boot -protected-path /run -protected-path /usr -protected-path /opt -protected-path /var -protected-path /dev/log -protected-path /root -protected-path /sys - -read-protected-path /etc/ssh -read-protected-path /proc/kallsyms -read-protected-path /proc/kcore -read-protected-path /proc/slabinfo -read-protected-path /proc/modules -read-protected-path /usr/lib/modules -read-protected-path /boot -read-protected-path /etc/shadow -read-protected-path /etc/shadow- -read-protected-path /etc/gshadow -read-protected-path /etc/gshadow- -read-protected-path /sys - -high-protected-path /etc/ssh -high-protected-path /proc/kcore -high-protected-path /proc/sys -high-protected-path /proc/bus -high-protected-path /proc/slabinfo -high-protected-path /proc/modules -high-protected-path /proc/kallsyms -high-protected-path /etc/passwd -high-protected-path /etc/shadow -high-protected-path /var/backups -high-protected-path /etc/shadow- -high-protected-path /etc/gshadow -high-protected-path /etc/gshadow- -high-protected-path /var/log -high-protected-path /dev/mem -high-protected-path /dev/kmem -high-protected-path /dev/port -high-protected-path /dev/log -high-protected-path /sys -high-protected-path /etc/ppp -high-protected-path /etc/samba/smbpasswd -#to protect kernel images -high-protected-path /boot -high-protected-path /usr/lib/modules -high-protected-path /usr/src - -inherit-learn /etc/cron.d -inherit-learn /etc/cron.hourly -inherit-learn /etc/cron.daily -inherit-learn /etc/cron.weekly -inherit-learn /etc/cron.monthly diff --git a/community/gradm/policy b/community/gradm/policy deleted file mode 100644 index 140b4f14b..000000000 --- a/community/gradm/policy +++ /dev/null @@ -1,491 +0,0 @@ -#sample default policy for grsecurity -# -# Role flags: -# A -> This role is an administrative role, thus it has special privilege normal -# roles do not have. In particular, this role bypasses the -# additional ptrace restrictions -# N -> Don't require authentication for this role. To access -# the role, use gradm -n -# s -> This role is a special role, meaning it does not belong to a -# user or group, and does not require an enforced secure policy -# base to be included in the ruleset -# u -> This role is a user role -# g -> This role is a group role -# G -> This role can use gradm to authenticate to the kernel -# A policy for gradm will automatically be added to the role -# T -> Enable TPE for this role -# l -> Enable learning for this role -# P -> Use PAM authentication for this role. -# R -> Enable persistence of special role. Normal special roles will -# be removed upon exit of the process that entered the role, or -# upon unauth (this is what changes the apache process' role back -# to its normal role after being restarted from the admin role, for -# instance). Role persistence allows a special role to be used for -# system shutdown, as the point at which the admin's shell/SSH -# session is terminated won't cause the rest of the shutdown -# sequence to execute with reduced privilege. Do *NOT* use this -# flag with any role that does anything but shut the system down. -# This role will also be transferred to the init process upon -# writing to /dev/initctl. This allows init to execute the rc -# scripts for shutdown with the necessary privilege. -# For usability reasons, we allow the removal of persistence through -# the normal unauth process (so persistence only survives exit). -# -# a role can only be one of user, group, or special -# -# role_allow_ip IP/optional netmask -# eg: role_allow_ip 192.168.1.0/24 -# You can have as many of these per role as you want -# They restrict the use of a role to a list of IPs. If a user -# is on the system that would normally get the role does not -# belong to those lists of IPs, the system falls back through -# its method of determining a role for the user -# -# Role hierarchy -# user -> group -> default -# First a user role attempts to match, if one is not found, -# a group role attempts to match, if one is not found, -# the default role is used. -# -# role_transitions ... -# eg: role_transitions www_admin dns_admin -# -# role transitions specify which special roles a given role is allowed -# to authenticate to. This applies to special roles that do not -# require password authentication as well. If a user tries to -# authenticate to a role that is not within his transition table, he -# will receive a permission denied error -# -# Nested subjects -# subject /usr/bin/su:/usr/bin/bash:/usr/bin/cat -# / rwx -# +CAP_ALL -# grant privilege to specific processes if they are executed -# within a trusted path. In this case, privilege is -# granted if /usr/bin/cat is executed from /usr/bin/bash, which is -# executed from /usr/bin/su. -# -# Configuration inheritance on nested subjects -# nested subjects inherit rules from their parents. In the -# example above, the nested subject would inherit rules -# from the nested subject for /usr/bin/su:/usr/bin/bash, -# and the subject /usr/bin/su -# View the 1.9.x documentation for more information on -# configuration inheritance -# -# new object modes: -# m -> allow creation of setuid/setgid files/directories -# and modification of files/directories to be setuid/setgid -# M -> audit the setuid/setgid creation/modification -# c -> allow creation of the file/directory -# C -> audit the creation -# d -> allow deletion of the file/directory -# D -> audit the deletion -# p -> reject all ptraces to this object -# l -> allow a hardlink at this path -# (hardlinking requires at a minimum c and l modes, and the target -# link cannot have any greater permission than the source file) -# L -> audit link creation -# f -> needed to mark the pipe used for communication with init -# to transfer the privilege of the persistent role; only valid -# within a persistent role. Transfer only occurs when the file is -# opened for writing -# Z -> tells gradm to ignore earlier object of the same name and use this -# one instead -# -# new subject modes: -# O -> disable "writable library" restrictions for this task -# t -> allow this process to ptrace any process (use with caution) -# r -> relax ptrace restrictions (allows process to ptrace processes -# other than its own descendants) -# i -> enable inheritance-based learning for this subject, causing -# all accesses of this subject and anything it executes to be placed -# in this subject, and inheritance flags added to executable objects -# in this subject -# a -> allow this process to talk to the /dev/grsec device -# s -> enable AT_SECURE when entering this subject -# (enables the same environment sanitization that occurs in glibc -# upon execution of a suid binary) -# x -> allows executable anonymous shared memory for this subject -# Z -> tells gradm to ignore earlier subject of the same path and use this -# one instead - -# user/group transitions: -# You may now specify what users and groups a given subject can -# transition to. This can be done on an inclusive or exclusive basis. -# Omitting these rules allows a process with proper privilege granted by -# capabilities to transition to any user/group. -# -# Examples: -# subject /usr/bin/su -# user_transition_allow root spender -# group_transition_allow root spender -# subject /usr/bin/su -# user_transition_deny evilhacker -# subject /usr/bin/su -# group_transition_deny evilhacker1 evilhacker2 -# -# Domains: -# With domains you can combine users that don't share a common -# GID as well as groups so that they share a single policy -# Domains work just like roles, with the only exception being that -# the line starting with "role" is replaced with one of the following: -# domain somedomainname u user1 user2 user3 user4 ... usern -# domain somedomainname g group1 group2 group3 group4 ... groupn -# -# Inverted socket policies: -# Rules such as -# connect ! www.google.com:80 stream tcp -# are now allowed, which allows you to specify that a process can connect to anything -# except to port 80 of www.google.com with a stream tcp socket -# the inverted socket matching also works on bind rules -# -# INADDR_ANY overriding -# You can now force a given subject to bind to a particular IP address on the machine -# This is useful for some chrooted environments, to ensure that the source IP they -# use is one of your choosing -# to use, add a line like: -# ip_override 192.168.0.1 -# -# Per-interface socket policies: -# Rules such as -# bind eth1:80 stream tcp -# bind eth0#1:22 stream tcp -# are now allowed, giving you the ability to tie specific socket rules -# to a single interface (or by using the inverted rules, all but one -# interface). Virtual interfaces are specified by the # -# syntax. If an interface is specified, no IP/netmask or host may be -# specified for the rule. -# -# Allowing additional socket families: -# Before v2.2.1 of the RBAC system, a subject that specified -# connect/bind rules limited only the socket usage of IPv4, allowing -# any other socket families to be used. Starting with v2.2.1 of the -# RBAC system, when connect/bind rules are used, additional rules -# will be required to unlock the use of additional socket families -# (outside of the common unix family). Multiple families can be -# specified per line. -# To enable use of IPv6, add the line: -# sock_allow_family ipv6 -# To enable use of netlink, add the line: -# sock_allow_family netlink -# To enable all other families, add the line: -# sock_allow_family all -# -# New learning system: -# To learn on a given subject: add l (the letter l, not the number 1) -# to the subject mode -# If you want to learn with the most restrictive policy, use the -# following: -# subject /path/to/bin lo -# / h -# -CAP_ALL -# connect disabled -# bind disabled -# Resource learning is also supported, so lines like -# RES_AS 0 0 -# can be used to learn a particular resource -# -# To learn on a given role, add l to the role mode -# For both of these, to enable learning, enable the system like: -# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -E -# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the -# learning phase with: -# gradm -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy -# To use full system learning, enable the system like: -# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -# and then generate the rules after disabling the system after the -# learning phase with: -# gradm -F -L /etc/grsec/learning.logs -O /etc/grsec/policy -# -# New PaX flag format (replaces PaX subject flags): -# PaX flags can be forced on or off, regardless of the flags on the -# binary, by using + or - before the following PaX flag names: -# PAX_SEGMEXEC -# PAX_PAGEEXEC -# PAX_MPROTECT -# PAX_RANDMMAP -# PAX_EMUTRAMP -# -# New feature for easier policy maintenance: -# replace -# e.g.: -# replace CVSROOT /home/cvs -# now $(CVSROOT) can be used in any subject or object pathname, like: -# $(CVSROOT)/grsecurity r -# This will translate to /home/cvs/grsecurity r -# This feature makes it easier to update policies by naming specific -# paths by their function, then only having to update those paths once -# to have it affect a large number of subjects/objects. -# -# capability auditing / log suppression -# use of a capability can be audited by adding "audit" to the line, eg: -# +CAP_SYS_RAWIO audit -# log suppression for denial of a capbility can be done by adding "suppress": -# -CAP_SYS_RAWIO suppress -# -# Per-role umask enforcement: -# If you have a user that you want to be assured cannot accidentally -# create a file that others can read (a confidentiality issue) -# add the following under the role declaration: -# role_umask 077 -# any normal octal umask may be specified -# Note that unlike the normal umask, this umask will also apply -# to the permissions one can chmod/fchmod a file to -# -# Note that the omission of any feature of a role or subject -# results in a default-allow -# For instance, if no capability rules are added in a subject without -# policy inheritance ("o" in subject mode), an implicit +CAP_ALL is used -# -# Also note that policy inheritance does not exist for network policies, only -# file objects and capabilities inherit policy -# -# Commonly-used objects can be defined and used in multiple subjects -# As an example, we'll create a variable out of a list of objects -# and their associated permissions that RBAC enforces -# files, connect/bind rules, and capabilities can currently be added to a define - -define grsec_denied { - /boot h - /dev/grsec h - /dev/kmem h - /dev/mem h - /dev/port h - /etc/grsec h - /proc/kcore h - /proc/slabinfo h - /proc/modules h - /proc/kallsyms h - # hide and suppress logs about accessing this path - /usr/lib/modules hs - /etc/ssh h -} -# usage: -# $grsec_denied - -role shutdown sARG -subject / rvka - / - /dev - /dev/urandom r - /dev/random r - /etc r - /usr rx - /proc r - $grsec_denied - -CAP_ALL - connect disabled - bind disabled - -subject /usr/lib/systemd/systemd rvkao - / rwcdmlxi -subject /usr/bin/systemctl rvkao - / rwcdmlxi - /dev/initctl rwf - /run/initctl rwf - -# Make sure to unauthenticate with gradm -u from -# the admin role after restarting a service -# The service started will run with admin -# privileges until you run gradm -u or your shell exits - -role admin sA -subject / rvka - / rwcdmlxi - -role default G -role_transitions admin shutdown -subject / - / r - /opt rx - /home rwxcd - /mnt rw - /dev - /dev/urandom r - /dev/random r - /dev/zero rw - /dev/input rw - /dev/psaux rw - /dev/null rw - /dev/tty? rw - /dev/console rw - /dev/tty rw - /dev/pts rw - /dev/ptmx rw - /dev/dsp rw - /dev/mixer rw - /dev/initctl rw - /dev/fd0 r - /dev/sr0 r - /usr rx -# compilation of kernel code should be done within the admin role - /usr/src h - /etc rx - /proc rwx - /proc/sys r - /sys h - /root r - /run r - /tmp rwcd - /var rwxcd - /var/tmp rwcd - /var/log r -# hide the kernel images and modules - $grsec_denied - -# if sshd needs to be restarted, it can be done through the admin role -# restarting sshd should be followed immediately by a gradm -u - /usr/bin/sshd - - -CAP_KILL - -CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG - -CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE - -CAP_NET_RAW - -CAP_MKNOD - -CAP_SYS_ADMIN - -CAP_SYS_RAWIO - -CAP_SYS_MODULE - -CAP_SYS_PTRACE - -CAP_NET_ADMIN - -CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE - -CAP_NET_RAW - -CAP_SYS_CHROOT - -CAP_SYS_BOOT - -CAP_SETFCAP - -CAP_SYSLOG - -# RES_AS 100M 100M - -# connect 192.168.1.0/24:22 stream tcp -# bind 0.0.0.0 stream dgram tcp udp - -# the d flag protects /proc fd and mem entries for sshd -# all daemons should have 'p' in their subject mode to prevent -# an attacker from killing the service (and restarting it with trojaned -# config file or taking the port it reserved to run a trojaned service) - -subject /usr/bin/sshd dpo - / - /* h - /usr/bin/bash x - /dev h - /dev/random r - /dev/urandom r - /dev/null rw - /dev/ptmx rw - /dev/pts rw - /dev/tty rw - /dev/tty? rw - /etc r - /etc/grsec h - /home - /home/*/.ssh/authorized_keys r - /root - /proc r - /proc/*/oom_adj rw - /proc/*/oom_score_adj rw - /proc/kcore h - /proc/sys h - /proc/sys/kernel/ngroups_max r - /selinux r - /usr/lib rx - /usr/lib32 rx - /usr/libx32 rx - /usr/share/zoneinfo r - /var/log - /var/spool/mail - /var/log/lastlog rw - /var/log/wtmp w - /var/run - /run - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - /var/run/sshd - /var/run/utmp rw - /var/run/utmpx rw - /var/run/.nscd_socket rw - - -CAP_ALL - +CAP_CHOWN - +CAP_SETGID - +CAP_SETUID - +CAP_SYS_CHROOT - +CAP_SYS_RESOURCE - +CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG - +CAP_AUDIT_WRITE - # to access user keys - +CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE - -subject /usr/bin/Xorg - /dev/mem rw - - +CAP_SYS_ADMIN - +CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG - +CAP_SYS_RAWIO - -subject /usr/bin/ssh - /etc/ssh/ssh_config r - -subject /usr/bin/postgres - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/exim - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/syslog-ng - +CAP_SYS_ADMIN - -subject /usr/bin/rsyslogd - +CAP_SYS_ADMIN - -subject /usr/bin/cron - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/crond - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/login - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - /var/log/wtmp w - /var/log/faillog rwcd - -subject /usr/bin/su - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/sudo - /run/systemd/journal/dev-log rw - -subject /usr/bin/agetty - /var/log/wtmp w - -subject /usr/bin/xauth - /home r - /home/*/.Xauthority-* rwcdl - -# prevent ld.so breakouts of subjects with /usr/lib rx - -# many distros clutter up /usr/lib with shell scripts -# that can be easily hijacked for malicious purposes -subject /usr/lib o - / h - -CAP_ALL - connect disabled - bind disabled - -subject /usr/lib32 o - / h - -CAP_ALL - connect disabled - bind disabled - -subject /usr/lib/ld-linux.so.2 o - / h - -CAP_ALL - connect disabled - bind disabled - -subject /usr/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 o - / h - -CAP_ALL - connect disabled - bind disabled