mirror of
https://github.com/archlinuxarm/PKGBUILDs.git
synced 2024-11-08 22:45:43 +00:00
core/linux-veyron to 3.14.0-25
This commit is contained in:
Kevin Mihelich
parent
638793c99b
commit
cdfae559ea
10 changed files with 551 additions and 21 deletions
|
|
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 478d6783c5483f4d2201bc0a91f92e7880df11cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From 10831906a80232a8796cf055518e3b35f558d8a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Kevin Mihelich <kevin@archlinuxarm.org>
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Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 20:35:06 -0600
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Subject: [PATCH 1/4] use chromiumos mwifiex drivers
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Subject: [PATCH 1/8] use chromiumos mwifiex drivers
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|
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Signed-off-by: Kevin Mihelich <kevin@archlinuxarm.org>
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---
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@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ index f9ee413f6e71..9686025923c5 100644
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#define BLOCK_MODE 1
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--
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2.11.0
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2.13.0
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|
|
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|
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From 4cc0eec56f57f137ac6ae3b91dbafa5541811644 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From 41ebe011fa78d21a9984d13609cc0144d6b5d76d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Bing Zhao <bzhao@marvell.com>
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Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 16:10:21 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH 2/4] mwifiex: do not create AP and P2P interfaces upon driver
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Subject: [PATCH 2/8] mwifiex: do not create AP and P2P interfaces upon driver
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loading
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Bug 60747 - 1286:2044 [Microsoft Surface Pro]
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@ -62,5 +62,5 @@ index e43afc127119..587f4ae4818d 100644
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mwifiex_drv_get_driver_version(adapter, fmt, sizeof(fmt) - 1);
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--
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2.11.0
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2.13.0
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|
|
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|
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From b4ba27c1b3ba7e1405b9e3a12ff29f01f2e6d4ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From 3ee1dc42158527bd04c4ec455dde2803521ab870 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
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Date: Mon, 25 May 2015 16:38:07 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 3/4] UPSTREAM: soc/rockchip: add handler for usb-uart
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Subject: [PATCH 3/8] UPSTREAM: soc/rockchip: add handler for usb-uart
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functionality
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Some Rockchip SoCs provide the possibility to use a usb-phy as passthru for
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@ -302,5 +302,5 @@ index 000000000000..97754f9fc7f2
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+}
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+early_param("rockchip.usb_uart", rockchip_usb_uart);
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--
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2.11.0
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2.13.0
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|
|
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|
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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From e9d25d3d9e86de0ff89e9d9f9d32f97205e2afab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From fcb6c288ea38ea7ee02b9b33b02d45a55017ac18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Kevin Mihelich <kevin@archlinuxarm.org>
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Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2015 17:48:41 -0600
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Subject: [PATCH 4/4] fix brcmfmac oops and race condition
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Subject: [PATCH 4/8] fix brcmfmac oops and race condition
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This fixes a potential null pointer dereference by checking if null before
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freeing the vif struct.
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@ -89,5 +89,5 @@ index 05d40426b85b..7006d19fb8d1 100644
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/*
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--
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2.11.0
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2.13.0
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|
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|
|
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
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From d9b2000fed21f7ed990ffe7dc0b26834242e6fce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Greg Price <price@MIT.EDU>
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Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2013 15:02:33 -0500
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Subject: [PATCH 5/8] random: simplify loop in random_read
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The loop condition never changes until just before a break, so we
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might as well write it as a constant. Also since a996996dd75a
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("random: drop weird m_time/a_time manipulation") we don't do anything
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after the loop finishes, so the 'break's might as well return
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directly. Some other simplifications.
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There should be no change in behavior introduced by this commit.
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Signed-off-by: Greg Price <price@mit.edu>
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Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
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---
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drivers/char/random.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
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1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
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index 8757d727116f..d9e8504894ee 100644
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--- a/drivers/char/random.c
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+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
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@@ -1287,53 +1287,32 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
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static ssize_t
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random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
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{
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- ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
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+ ssize_t n;
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if (nbytes == 0)
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return 0;
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- while (nbytes > 0) {
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- n = nbytes;
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- if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
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- n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
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-
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- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, n);
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-
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- if (n < 0) {
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- retval = n;
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- break;
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- }
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-
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+ nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
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+ while (1) {
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+ n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
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+ if (n < 0)
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+ return n;
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trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
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ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
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ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
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-
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- if (n == 0) {
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- if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
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- retval = -EAGAIN;
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- break;
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- }
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-
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- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
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- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
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- random_read_wakeup_thresh);
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-
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- if (signal_pending(current)) {
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- retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
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- break;
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- }
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-
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- continue;
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- }
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-
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- count += n;
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- buf += n;
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- nbytes -= n;
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- break; /* This break makes the device work */
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- /* like a named pipe */
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+ if (n > 0)
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+ return n;
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+ /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
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+
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+ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
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+ return -EAGAIN;
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+
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+ wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
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+ ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
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+ random_read_wakeup_thresh);
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+ if (signal_pending(current))
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+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
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}
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-
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- return (count ? count : retval);
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}
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static ssize_t
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--
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2.13.0
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|
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@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
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From 8edd5ca21ae45a59021a259932dd22a4281e155e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 04:13:05 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH 6/8] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
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The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
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developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
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OpenBSD.
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The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
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file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
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available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
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/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
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well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
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entirely.
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The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
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request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
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until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
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/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
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/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
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initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
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before the init scripts start execution.
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This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
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interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
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acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
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general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
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in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
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on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
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interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
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urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
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this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
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during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
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other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
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SYNOPSIS
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#include <linux/random.h>
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int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
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DESCRIPTION
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The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
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with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
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space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
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cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
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simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
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probabilistic sampling.
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If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
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/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
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/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
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obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
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entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
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If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
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either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
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the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
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|
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If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
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will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
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/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
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initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
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errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
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|
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The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
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the following function:
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int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
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{
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int ret;
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|
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if (buflen > 256)
|
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goto failure;
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ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
|
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
|
||||
if (ret == buflen)
|
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return 0;
|
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failure:
|
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errno = EIO;
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return -1;
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}
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|
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RETURN VALUE
|
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On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
|
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returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
|
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caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
|
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/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
|
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signal.
|
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|
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On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
|
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|
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ERRORS
|
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EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
|
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|
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EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
|
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|
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EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
|
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getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
|
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GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
|
||||
|
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EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
|
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interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
|
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of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
|
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are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
|
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in the signal(7) man page.
|
||||
|
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NOTES
|
||||
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
|
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return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
|
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entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
|
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the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
|
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way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
|
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with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
|
||||
|
||||
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
|
||||
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
|
||||
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
|
||||
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
|
||||
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
|
||||
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
|
||||
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
|
||||
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
|
||||
would be unfriendly.
|
||||
|
||||
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
|
||||
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
|
||||
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
|
||||
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
|
||||
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
|
||||
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
|
||||
|
||||
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
|
||||
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
|
||||
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
|
||||
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
|
||||
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
|
||||
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
|
||||
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
|
||||
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
|
||||
drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
|
||||
include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +++
|
||||
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++-
|
||||
include/uapi/linux/random.h | 9 +++++++++
|
||||
6 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
index 3934f1ed30ac..7af3997e33de 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
|
||||
@@ -361,3 +361,4 @@
|
||||
352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
|
||||
353 i386 renameat2
|
||||
354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
|
||||
+355 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
index a1e46ce5cacf..0251a2c7486b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
|
||||
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@
|
||||
315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
|
||||
316 common renameat2
|
||||
317 common seccomp sys_seccomp
|
||||
+318 common getrandom sys_getrandom
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
index d9e8504894ee..08279b68375a 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@
|
||||
#include <linux/kmemcheck.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
|
||||
#include <linux/irq.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
||||
+#include <linux/completion.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <asm/processor.h>
|
||||
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
|
||||
@@ -401,6 +403,7 @@ static struct poolinfo {
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
|
||||
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
|
||||
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);
|
||||
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
|
||||
|
||||
/**********************************************************************
|
||||
@@ -657,6 +660,7 @@ retry:
|
||||
r->entropy_total = 0;
|
||||
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
|
||||
prandom_reseed_late();
|
||||
+ wake_up_interruptible(&urandom_init_wait);
|
||||
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1137,13 +1141,14 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssize_t ret = 0, i;
|
||||
__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
|
||||
+ int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
|
||||
|
||||
trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
|
||||
xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
|
||||
nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
while (nbytes) {
|
||||
- if (need_resched()) {
|
||||
+ if (large_request && need_resched()) {
|
||||
if (signal_pending(current)) {
|
||||
if (ret == 0)
|
||||
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
|
||||
@@ -1285,7 +1290,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static ssize_t
|
||||
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
+_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssize_t n;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1304,7 +1309,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
/* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
|
||||
|
||||
- if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
|
||||
+ if (nonblock)
|
||||
return -EAGAIN;
|
||||
|
||||
wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
|
||||
@@ -1316,6 +1321,12 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static ssize_t
|
||||
+random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static ssize_t
|
||||
urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
@@ -1456,6 +1467,29 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
|
||||
.llseek = noop_llseek,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
|
||||
+ unsigned int, flags)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
|
||||
+ return -EINVAL;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (count > INT_MAX)
|
||||
+ count = INT_MAX;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
|
||||
+ return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) {
|
||||
+ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
|
||||
+ return -EAGAIN;
|
||||
+ wait_event_interruptible(urandom_init_wait,
|
||||
+ nonblocking_pool.initialized);
|
||||
+ if (signal_pending(current))
|
||||
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/***************************************************************
|
||||
* Random UUID interface
|
||||
*
|
||||
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
index 029b012aa075..07f6e749fef6 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
|
||||
@@ -855,6 +855,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
|
||||
unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
|
||||
+asmlinkage long sys_getrandom(char __user *buf, size_t count,
|
||||
+ unsigned int flags);
|
||||
+
|
||||
asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
|
||||
const char __user *uargs);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
index de5ce24594dd..fb7247c39241 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
|
||||
@@ -703,9 +703,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
|
||||
|
||||
#define __NR_seccomp 277
|
||||
__SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
|
||||
+#define __NR_getrandom 278
|
||||
+__SYSCALL(__NR_getrandom, sys_getrandom)
|
||||
|
||||
#undef __NR_syscalls
|
||||
-#define __NR_syscalls 278
|
||||
+#define __NR_syscalls 279
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* All syscalls below here should go away really,
|
||||
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
|
||||
index fff3528a078f..3f93d1695e7f 100644
|
||||
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
|
||||
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
|
||||
@@ -40,4 +40,13 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
|
||||
__u32 buf[0];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Flags for getrandom(2)
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
|
||||
+ * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+#define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001
|
||||
+#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
|
||||
+
|
||||
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.13.0
|
||||
|
||||
54
core/linux-veyron/0007-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch
Normal file
54
core/linux-veyron/0007-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||
From 46b29aab711516c739cdc549a044649e13a940f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 10:56:34 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] ARM: wire up getrandom syscall
|
||||
|
||||
Add the new getrandom syscall for ARM.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
|
||||
---
|
||||
arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
|
||||
arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
|
||||
arch/arm/kernel/calls.S | 1 +
|
||||
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
index acabef1a75df..fb77fcd2690b 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
|
||||
|
||||
-#define __NR_syscalls (384)
|
||||
+#define __NR_syscalls (388)
|
||||
#define __ARM_NR_cmpxchg (__ARM_NR_BASE+0x00fff0)
|
||||
|
||||
#define __ARCH_WANT_STAT64
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
index 86f5789d23c8..ea9d2ff2befc 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
|
||||
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@
|
||||
#define __NR_renameat2 (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+382)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define __NR_seccomp (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+383)
|
||||
+#define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This may need to be greater than __NR_last_syscall+1 in order to
|
||||
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
index e40999adf68b..078929db42f2 100644
|
||||
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
|
||||
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@
|
||||
CALL(sys_sched_getattr)
|
||||
CALL(sys_ni_syscall) /* sys_renameat2 */
|
||||
CALL(sys_seccomp)
|
||||
+ CALL(sys_getrandom)
|
||||
#ifndef syscalls_counted
|
||||
.equ syscalls_padding, ((NR_syscalls + 3) & ~3) - NR_syscalls
|
||||
#define syscalls_counted
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.13.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|||
From 453c642ae1fb71de220b25b6289d58a4730038a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 16:19:54 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] random: Wake up all getrandom(2) callers when pool is
|
||||
ready
|
||||
|
||||
If more than one application invokes getrandom(2) before the pool
|
||||
is ready, then all bar one will be stuck forever because we use
|
||||
wake_up_interruptible which wakes up a single task.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch replaces it with wake_up_all.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
||||
---
|
||||
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
index 08279b68375a..b907271d68e1 100644
|
||||
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||||
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ retry:
|
||||
r->entropy_total = 0;
|
||||
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
|
||||
prandom_reseed_late();
|
||||
- wake_up_interruptible(&urandom_init_wait);
|
||||
+ wake_up_all(&urandom_init_wait);
|
||||
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.13.0
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ pkgbase=linux-veyron
|
|||
_kernelname=${pkgbase#linux}
|
||||
_desc="Veyron Chromebooks"
|
||||
pkgver=3.14.0
|
||||
pkgrel=24
|
||||
_commit=b093583dda7e0be315bbf9aea4a697d1e20cd58e
|
||||
pkgrel=25
|
||||
_commit=6eea2a7519579f14f1837e977068ea28ad98fd77
|
||||
arch=('armv7h')
|
||||
url="https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/chromeos-3.14"
|
||||
license=('GPL2')
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ source=("https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+archiv
|
|||
'0002-mwifiex-do-not-create-AP-and-P2P-interfaces-upon-dri.patch'
|
||||
'0003-UPSTREAM-soc-rockchip-add-handler-for-usb-uart-funct.patch'
|
||||
'0004-fix-brcmfmac-oops-and-race-condition.patch'
|
||||
'0005-random-simplify-loop-in-random_read.patch'
|
||||
'0006-random-introduce-getrandom-2-system-call.patch'
|
||||
'0007-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch'
|
||||
'0008-random-Wake-up-all-getrandom-2-callers-when-pool-is-.patch'
|
||||
'config'
|
||||
'kernel.its'
|
||||
'kernel.keyblock'
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,16 +32,20 @@ source=("https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+archiv
|
|||
'cmdline'
|
||||
'brcmfmac4354-sdio.txt'
|
||||
'99-veyron-brcm.rules')
|
||||
md5sums=('8f71593561163c049a487751fab6dc8e'
|
||||
md5sums=('224c737defe8db8a21c303c9633d6412'
|
||||
'bda543cb5943eac34e16d12911f3ee99'
|
||||
'5e2d7cd74de07d13052de99411c13a2f'
|
||||
'1534c1dbfe5df35a5634072f7b912840'
|
||||
'20f8931f3795e5226829d48c3d470334'
|
||||
'3ac01cf94902936a732bf3f0df79eb43'
|
||||
'2e3d4a2634a76ff37f3dae94a7ced6a3'
|
||||
'8aaa2709e1c9466c71c6646643eb4edf'
|
||||
'40351745df5a762edd50a50386df71ee'
|
||||
'f1860967a80286449b23439ad51dc7b0'
|
||||
'7457f68b1ed40592f0057a9e3d5e546c'
|
||||
'78efe11e59a48fe1576f195e9fe27e92'
|
||||
'0a6e16818f4f1294b4d7bebad952c46f'
|
||||
'f4e19254d5d8e4b427134e535c728186'
|
||||
'997b5f5e7cafc3547888fc82b40d5d01'
|
||||
'7c5c670779e324f1ce9286f7cd605160'
|
||||
'21cde62bbc6dc0e9dd1b3f6771a1438d'
|
||||
'605c38eb7c016d8283db3d3801067202'
|
||||
'9aac49e2baa96444f9314d02035a90a7'
|
||||
'761d2e8cef38584b9e2f478e8096e458'
|
||||
'61c5ff73c136ed07a7aadbf58db3d96a'
|
||||
'584777ae88bce2c5659960151b64c7d8'
|
||||
|
|
@ -50,6 +58,10 @@ prepare() {
|
|||
git apply 0002-mwifiex-do-not-create-AP-and-P2P-interfaces-upon-dri.patch
|
||||
git apply 0003-UPSTREAM-soc-rockchip-add-handler-for-usb-uart-funct.patch
|
||||
git apply 0004-fix-brcmfmac-oops-and-race-condition.patch
|
||||
git apply 0005-random-simplify-loop-in-random_read.patch
|
||||
git apply 0006-random-introduce-getrandom-2-system-call.patch
|
||||
git apply 0007-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch
|
||||
git apply 0008-random-Wake-up-all-getrandom-2-callers-when-pool-is-.patch
|
||||
|
||||
cp config .config
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
#
|
||||
# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
|
||||
# Linux/arm 3.14.0-24 Kernel Configuration
|
||||
# Linux/arm 3.14.0-25 Kernel Configuration
|
||||
#
|
||||
CONFIG_ARM=y
|
||||
CONFIG_ARM_HAS_SG_CHAIN=y
|
||||
|
|
@ -1138,6 +1138,8 @@ CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_3WIRE=y
|
|||
# CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_INTEL is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_BCM is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_QCA is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_AG6XX is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_BT_HCIUART_MRVL is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_BT_HCIBCM203X=m
|
||||
CONFIG_BT_HCIBPA10X=m
|
||||
CONFIG_BT_HCIBFUSB=m
|
||||
|
|
@ -4311,6 +4313,7 @@ CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
|
|||
# CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_SECURITY_CHROMIUMOS is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_SECURITY_CHROMIUMOS_DEVICE_JAIL is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_IMA is not set
|
||||
# CONFIG_EVM is not set
|
||||
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue