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core/linux-imx6 to 3.14.79-2

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This commit is contained in:
Kevin Mihelich 2017-05-08 02:09:44 +00:00
parent f4d7865442
commit d239d39939
6 changed files with 539 additions and 10 deletions
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16
core/linux-imx6/0001-Bluetooth-allocate-static-minor-for-vhci.patch
View file

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
From 5d77ba2d26110c678b40fd723866a17d4036de12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From d1c07c41c09fb7219b6cd930100f098ed7ab2197 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lucas De Marchi <lucas.demarchi@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 02:19:26 -0300
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Bluetooth: allocate static minor for vhci
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Bluetooth: allocate static minor for vhci
Commit bfacbb9 (Bluetooth: Use devname:vhci module alias for virtual HCI
driver) added the module alias to hci_vhci module so it's possible to
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/devices.txt b/Documentation/devices.txt
index 10378cc..04356f5 100644
index 10378cc48374..04356f5bc3af 100644
--- a/Documentation/devices.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devices.txt
@@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ Your cooperation is appreciated.
@ -40,10 +40,10 @@ index 10378cc..04356f5 100644
140 = /dev/relay8 Berkshire Products Octal relay card
141 = /dev/relay16 Berkshire Products ISO-16 relay card
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c
index 1ef6990..add1c6a 100644
index bbe6643e299d..b9c96a98e8f4 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static const struct file_operations vhci_fops = {
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static const struct file_operations vhci_fops = {
static struct miscdevice vhci_miscdev= {
.name = "vhci",
.fops = &vhci_fops,
@ -52,13 +52,13 @@ index 1ef6990..add1c6a 100644
};
static int __init vhci_init(void)
@@ -385,3 +385,4 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bluetooth virtual HCI driver ver " VERSION);
@@ -386,3 +386,4 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Bluetooth virtual HCI driver ver " VERSION);
MODULE_VERSION(VERSION);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_ALIAS("devname:vhci");
+MODULE_ALIAS_MISCDEV(VHCI_MINOR);
diff --git a/include/linux/miscdevice.h b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
index 3737f72..7bb6148 100644
index 3737f7218f51..7bb6148d990f 100644
--- a/include/linux/miscdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
@ -70,5 +70,5 @@ index 3737f72..7bb6148 100644
#define DMAPI_MINOR 140 /* DMAPI */
#define NVRAM_MINOR 144
--
1.9.1
2.12.2

98
core/linux-imx6/0002-random-simplify-loop-in-random_read.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
From 5b3c92a29bbbcfe5a1ef24422a6b0ff5025b488c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Greg Price <price@MIT.EDU>
Date: Fri, 29 Nov 2013 15:02:33 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] random: simplify loop in random_read
The loop condition never changes until just before a break, so we
might as well write it as a constant. Also since a996996dd75a
("random: drop weird m_time/a_time manipulation") we don't do anything
after the loop finishes, so the 'break's might as well return
directly. Some other simplifications.
There should be no change in behavior introduced by this commit.
Signed-off-by: Greg Price <price@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a35a605c418a..b3b5e036087b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1287,53 +1287,32 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
static ssize_t
random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t n, retval = 0, count = 0;
+ ssize_t n;
if (nbytes == 0)
return 0;
- while (nbytes > 0) {
- n = nbytes;
- if (n > SEC_XFER_SIZE)
- n = SEC_XFER_SIZE;
-
- n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, n);
-
- if (n < 0) {
- retval = n;
- break;
- }
-
+ nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, SEC_XFER_SIZE);
+ while (1) {
+ n = extract_entropy_user(&blocking_pool, buf, nbytes);
+ if (n < 0)
+ return n;
trace_random_read(n*8, (nbytes-n)*8,
ENTROPY_BITS(&blocking_pool),
ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-
- if (n == 0) {
- if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
- retval = -EAGAIN;
- break;
- }
-
- wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
- random_read_wakeup_thresh);
-
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- retval = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
-
- continue;
- }
-
- count += n;
- buf += n;
- nbytes -= n;
- break; /* This break makes the device work */
- /* like a named pipe */
+ if (n > 0)
+ return n;
+ /* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
+
+ if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+
+ wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
+ ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) >=
+ random_read_wakeup_thresh);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
}
-
- return (count ? count : retval);
}
static ssize_t
--
2.12.2

328
core/linux-imx6/0003-random-introduce-getrandom-2-system-call.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
From db593c29763d57807dd66397795631f2d0b6afff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 04:13:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call
The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable
developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in
OpenBSD.
The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against
file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all
available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where
/dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not
well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode
entirely.
The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to
request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block
until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the
/dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the
/dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is
initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably
before the init scripts start execution.
This is because changing /dev/urandom reads to block represents an
interface change that could potentially break userspace which is not
acceptable. In practice, on most x86 desktop and server systems, in
general the entropy pool can be initialized before it is needed (and
in modern kernels, we will printk a warning message if not). However,
on an embedded system, this may not be the case. And so with this new
interface, we can provide the functionality of blocking until the
urandom pool has been initialized. Any userspace program which uses
this new functionality must take care to assure that if it is used
during the boot process, that it will not cause the init scripts or
other portions of the system startup to hang indefinitely.
SYNOPSIS
#include <linux/random.h>
int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf
with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user
space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other
cryptographic uses. It should not be used for Monte Carlo
simulations or other programs/algorithms which are doing
probabilistic sampling.
If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the
/dev/random pool instead of the /dev/urandom pool. The
/dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be
obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient
entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned.
If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will
either block, or return an error with errno set to EAGAIN if
the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags.
If the GRND_RANDOM bit is not set, then the /dev/urandom pool
will be used. Unlike using read(2) to fetch data from
/dev/urandom, if the urandom pool has not been sufficiently
initialized, getrandom(2) will block (or return -1 with the
errno set to EAGAIN if the GRND_NONBLOCK bit is set in flags).
The getentropy(2) system call in OpenBSD can be emulated using
the following function:
int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int ret;
if (buflen > 256)
goto failure;
ret = getrandom(buf, buflen, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == buflen)
return 0;
failure:
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
RETURN VALUE
On success, the number of bytes that was filled in the buf is
returned. This may not be all the bytes requested by the
caller via buflen if insufficient entropy was present in the
/dev/random pool, or if the system call was interrupted by a
signal.
On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately.
ERRORS
EINVAL An invalid flag was passed to getrandom(2)
EFAULT buf is outside the accessible address space.
EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and
getentropy(2) would have blocked if the
GRND_NONBLOCK flag was not set.
EINTR While blocked waiting for entropy, the call was
interrupted by a signal handler; see the description
of how interrupted read(2) calls on "slow" devices
are handled with and without the SA_RESTART flag
in the signal(7) man page.
NOTES
For small requests (buflen <= 256) getrandom(2) will not
return EINTR when reading from the urandom pool once the
entropy pool has been initialized, and it will return all of
the bytes that have been requested. This is the recommended
way to use getrandom(2), and is designed for compatibility
with OpenBSD's getentropy() system call.
However, if you are using GRND_RANDOM, then getrandom(2) may
block until the entropy accounting determines that sufficient
environmental noise has been gathered such that getrandom(2)
will be operating as a NRBG instead of a DRBG for those people
who are working in the NIST SP 800-90 regime. Since it may
block for a long time, these guarantees do *not* apply. The
user may want to interrupt a hanging process using a signal,
so blocking until all of the requested bytes are returned
would be unfriendly.
For this reason, the user of getrandom(2) MUST always check
the return value, in case it returns some error, or if fewer
bytes than requested was returned. In the case of
!GRND_RANDOM and small request, the latter should never
happen, but the careful userspace code (and all crypto code
should be careful) should check for this anyway!
Finally, unless you are doing long-term key generation (and
perhaps not even then), you probably shouldn't be using
GRND_RANDOM. The cryptographic algorithms used for
/dev/urandom are quite conservative, and so should be
sufficient for all purposes. The disadvantage of GRND_RANDOM
is that it can block, and the increased complexity required to
deal with partially fulfilled getrandom(2) requests.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zach Brown <zab@zabbo.net>
---
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +++
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++-
include/uapi/linux/random.h | 9 +++++++++
6 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 96bc506ac6de..c6272a3744a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -359,3 +359,4 @@
350 i386 finit_module sys_finit_module
351 i386 sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
+355 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 7f517ca19d32..32c5f16118a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@
313 common finit_module sys_finit_module
314 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr
315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr
+318 common getrandom sys_getrandom
#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index b3b5e036087b..a3150a06dbba 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@
#include <linux/kmemcheck.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -401,6 +403,7 @@ static struct poolinfo {
*/
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_read_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(urandom_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
/**********************************************************************
@@ -657,6 +660,7 @@ retry:
r->entropy_total = 0;
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
prandom_reseed_late();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&urandom_init_wait);
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
}
}
@@ -1137,13 +1141,14 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
{
ssize_t ret = 0, i;
__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+ int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
trace_extract_entropy_user(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
nbytes = account(r, nbytes, 0, 0);
while (nbytes) {
- if (need_resched()) {
+ if (large_request && need_resched()) {
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
@@ -1285,7 +1290,7 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
#endif
static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
ssize_t n;
@@ -1304,7 +1309,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
return n;
/* Pool is (near) empty. Maybe wait and retry. */
- if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
+ if (nonblock)
return -EAGAIN;
wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait,
@@ -1316,6 +1321,12 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
}
static ssize_t
+random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes);
+}
+
+static ssize_t
urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
{
static int maxwarn = 10;
@@ -1460,6 +1471,29 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
.llseek = noop_llseek,
};
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
+ unsigned int, flags)
+{
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (count > INT_MAX)
+ count = INT_MAX;
+
+ if (flags & GRND_RANDOM)
+ return _random_read(flags & GRND_NONBLOCK, buf, count);
+
+ if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0)) {
+ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ wait_event_interruptible(urandom_init_wait,
+ nonblocking_pool.initialized);
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+ }
+ return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
+}
+
/***************************************************************
* Random UUID interface
*
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index fad4082c50d9..7ab57c41c0a5 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -855,4 +855,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_process_vm_writev(pid_t pid,
asmlinkage long sys_kcmp(pid_t pid1, pid_t pid2, int type,
unsigned long idx1, unsigned long idx2);
asmlinkage long sys_finit_module(int fd, const char __user *uargs, int flags);
+asmlinkage long sys_getrandom(char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ unsigned int flags);
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index dde8041f40d2..4555c492684c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -696,9 +696,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_finit_module, sys_finit_module)
__SYSCALL(__NR_sched_setattr, sys_sched_setattr)
#define __NR_sched_getattr 275
__SYSCALL(__NR_sched_getattr, sys_sched_getattr)
+#define __NR_getrandom 278
+__SYSCALL(__NR_getrandom, sys_getrandom)
#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 276
+#define __NR_syscalls 279
/*
* All syscalls below here should go away really,
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
index fff3528a078f..3f93d1695e7f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -40,4 +40,13 @@ struct rand_pool_info {
__u32 buf[0];
};
+/*
+ * Flags for getrandom(2)
+ *
+ * GRND_NONBLOCK Don't block and return EAGAIN instead
+ * GRND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom
+ */
+#define GRND_NONBLOCK 0x0001
+#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002
+
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */
--
2.12.2

56
core/linux-imx6/0004-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
From d17493a9d19e5924cf5a00eb10f4a29c87084800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 10:56:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] ARM: wire up getrandom syscall
Add the new getrandom syscall for ARM.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
---
arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h | 1 +
arch/arm/kernel/calls.S | 3 +++
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
index 21ca0cebcab0..32640c431a08 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
* This may need to be greater than __NR_last_syscall+1 in order to
* account for the padding in the syscall table
*/
-#define __NR_syscalls (384)
+#define __NR_syscalls (388)
/*
* *NOTE*: This is a ghost syscall private to the kernel. Only the
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
index c3776331f407..79d451df99a3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/unistd.h
@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@
#define __NR_finit_module (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+379)
#define __NR_sched_setattr (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+380)
#define __NR_sched_getattr (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+381)
+#define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
/*
* The following SWIs are ARM private.
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
index 166e945de832..7df289c3507b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/calls.S
@@ -391,6 +391,9 @@
CALL(sys_finit_module)
/* 380 */ CALL(sys_sched_setattr)
CALL(sys_sched_getattr)
+ CALL(sys_ni_syscall)
+ CALL(sys_ni_syscall)
+ CALL(sys_getrandom)
#ifndef syscalls_counted
.equ syscalls_padding, ((NR_syscalls + 3) & ~3) - NR_syscalls
#define syscalls_counted
--
2.12.2

33
core/linux-imx6/0005-random-Wake-up-all-getrandom-2-callers-when-pool-is-.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
From 4d56e2fa3339828c89f640a9a6ffeb7a538c6448 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 16:19:54 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] random: Wake up all getrandom(2) callers when pool is
ready
If more than one application invokes getrandom(2) before the pool
is ready, then all bar one will be stuck forever because we use
wake_up_interruptible which wakes up a single task.
This patch replaces it with wake_up_all.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index a3150a06dbba..27eafd7e01f9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ retry:
r->entropy_total = 0;
if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
prandom_reseed_late();
- wake_up_interruptible(&urandom_init_wait);
+ wake_up_all(&urandom_init_wait);
pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name);
}
}
--
2.12.2

18
core/linux-imx6/PKGBUILD
View file

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ _srcname=linux-fslc-sr-${_commit}
_kernelname=${pkgname#linux}
_basekernel=3.14
pkgver=${_basekernel}.79
pkgrel=1
pkgrel=2
cryptodev_commit=f116a93224fc7b85f83d2c53f565f8fd86165ecc
arch=('armv7h')
@ -26,13 +26,21 @@ source=("linux-${_commit}::https://github.com/moonman/linux-fslc-sr/archive/${_c
"cryptodev-${cryptodev_commit}.tar.gz::https://github.com/cryptodev-linux/cryptodev-linux/archive/${cryptodev_commit}.tar.gz"
"git://git.code.sf.net/p/aufs/aufs3-standalone#branch=aufs${pkgver:0:4}.40+"
'0001-Bluetooth-allocate-static-minor-for-vhci.patch'
'0002-random-simplify-loop-in-random_read.patch'
'0003-random-introduce-getrandom-2-system-call.patch'
'0004-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch'
'0005-random-Wake-up-all-getrandom-2-callers-when-pool-is-.patch'
'fix_cec.patch'
'fix_cec_revb1.patch'
'config')
md5sums=('696f4bf47c2fd588fd579eec8ebd9159'
'bd52f10ced89e663d2f4d138948828fd'
'SKIP'
'1b276abe16d14e133f3f28d9c9e6bd68'
'7d3b27a74bd730debaf842e5d95b8a26'
'8bec0f9d7b39ca577a4e77b716a62ab0'
'130a1700e96db2168ac78c53d2cf29cb'
'cdbb8d3e1ff4935bfb17a623de80b0d0'
'a362dcdd9954d8d64740d0a135df1960'
'56ca9bd64f5539740ebbcba033dc13fd'
'b95d95786c1ffa8f95a1f5e7b4434ba0'
'3212b451fb00953863547ee658793a1a')
@ -49,6 +57,12 @@ prepare() {
msg2 "Fix hci_vhci no minor warning"
patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/0001-Bluetooth-allocate-static-minor-for-vhci.patch
msg2 "Backport getrandom syscall"
patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/0002-random-simplify-loop-in-random_read.patch
patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/0003-random-introduce-getrandom-2-system-call.patch
patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/0004-ARM-wire-up-getrandom-syscall.patch
patch -Np1 -i ${srcdir}/0005-random-Wake-up-all-getrandom-2-callers-when-pool-is-.patch
msg2 "Copying aufs3 patches into the kernel source tree"
cp -ru "${srcdir}/aufs3-standalone/"{Documentation,fs} "${srcdir}/${_srcname}/"
cp -ru "${srcdir}/aufs3-standalone/include/uapi/linux/aufs_type.h" "${srcdir}/${_srcname}/include/"{linux/,uapi/linux/}