mirror of
https://github.com/archlinuxarm/PKGBUILDs.git
synced 2024-09-19 22:08:32 +00:00
112 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
112 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
commit a5852a6db4b36f91d6254b2d8757f125e6e8e5cb
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Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Date: Fri May 16 12:55:16 2014 +0100
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Additional CVE-2014-0224 protection.
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Return a fatal error if an attempt is made to use a zero length
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master secret.
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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index 98c36e6..59011e3 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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@@ -1459,7 +1459,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
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if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
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{
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- if (s->session == NULL)
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+ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
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{
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/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
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commit eaa71076511eab5e84ed36ddecbfc6cc20a48952
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Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Date: Fri May 16 12:49:48 2014 +0100
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Fix for CVE-2014-0224
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Only accept change cipher spec when it is expected instead of at any
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time. This prevents premature setting of session keys before the master
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secret is determined which an attacker could use as a MITM attack.
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Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for reporting this issue
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and providing the initial fix this patch is based on.
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
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index a6b3c01..d35376d 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
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@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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index 6bc8bf9..98c36e6 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
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@@ -1316,6 +1316,15 @@ start:
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goto f_err;
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}
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+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
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+ {
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+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
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+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
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+ goto f_err;
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+ }
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+
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+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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+
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rr->length=0;
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if (s->msg_callback)
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diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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index 4de9d19..29f8b14 100644
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--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
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@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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/* we should decide if we expected this one */
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ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
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SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
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#else
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if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
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+ {
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+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
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+ }
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else
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
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#endif
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diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
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index cb8b249..4ac4199 100644
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--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
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+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
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@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
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#define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
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+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0040
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/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
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* restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
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